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Information, design and markets

  • Laurent Lamy, ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées ( PJSE )
  • Olivier Tercieux, chargé de recherche au CNRS ( PJSE )

    Cet enseignant est référent pour cette UE

S'il s'agit de l'enseignement principal d'un enseignant, le nom de celui-ci est indiqué en gras.

(Campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris), du 2 septembre au 20 décembre 2019

Market design seeks to offer practical solutions to various resource allocation problems. The field has recently enjoyed successes in applying economics tools and insights to improve the methods for organizing professional labor markets such as those for teachers or medical interns, for assigning students to public schools, for the allocation of social housing, for exchanging kidney donors with medical incompatibilities among transplant patients, for allocating government resources such as the spectrum (the FCC auctions in US and auctions for mobile phone licenses) or the advertising slots on internet (Google and Yahoo!'s keyword auctions). The general goal of market design consists not only in analyzing markets for the assignment of these “items”, but also in designing those markets and proposing new solutions in particular ones to use new computational technologies (combinatorial auctions are used in energy markets).

The course will present the theory of market design and its applications in two parts.

1. An important constraint encountered in many real-world allocation problems is that monetary transfers are limited or unavailable; for instance, public school seats and human kidneys cannot be traded for money. The first part of this class will cover the theory of market design when no monetary transfers are allowed. We will put a particular emphasis on applications to real world problems such as the assignment of public school seats to students, of social housing to agents, of kidney to sick patients, of teachers to schools... This strand of market design is referred to as matching.

2. The second half will cover the theory when monetary transfers are allowed. as in auctions and procurements There will be some lectures on the basic auction theory and classical results, but we will try to focus on newer material and open questions arising from applications such as search ad auctions, allocation of government resources such as radio spectrum (FCC),…

As a general goal, we will study existing or new market institutions, understand their properties, and think about whether they can be improved based on a mixture of theoretical, experimental, and empirical methods. However, the main part of the course will be oriented to the presentation of the market rules/algorithms and the fundamental theoretical results that anyone in this field should have in mind.

36 h course = 6 ECTS

http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/formations-et-vie-etudiante/masters/ape-analyse-et-politique-economiques/

Mots-clés : Économie,

Suivi et validation pour le master : Spécial : cf. le descriptif

Mentions & parcours :

Intitulés généraux :

Renseignements :

Mentions APE et PPD, secrétariat pédagogique, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, tél. : 01 80 52 19 43/44. Pour tout renseignement, veuillez écrire à master-ape(at)psemail.eu

http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/formations-et-vie-etudiante/masters/ape-analyse-et-politique-economiques/

 

Réception :

du lundi au mardi de 15 h 30 à 17 h 30 et du jeudi au vendredi de 10 h à 12 h 30.

Niveau requis :

M1

Site web : https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/formations/masters/ape-analyse-et-politique-economiques/

Adresse(s) électronique(s) de contact : master-ape(at)psemail.eu

Dernière modification de cette fiche par le service des enseignements (sg12@ehess.fr) : 17 mai 2019.

Contact : service des enseignements ✉ sg12@ehess.fr ☎ 01 49 54 23 17 ou 01 49 54 23 28
Réalisation : Direction des Systèmes d'Information
[Accès réservé]